Open banking needs better risk controls to ensure fintechs keep your money safe

John Turley-Ewart:

The challenge isn’t only about protecting customer data; it’s about safeguarding people’s savings

Open Banking Risk

Open Banking is a solid and appropriate method for consumers to manage their risks, and maximise deposit returns.

However as the US Synapse example below in yesterday’s Financial Post the risks at scale are significant and consumers must be diligent in moving to another FI to achieve returns. The consumer facing methodology is arcane and difficult to navigate when validating regulatory protections.

I also note that Turkey-Ewart has somewhat fallen to trap of mixing Open Banking with advertising. Open Banking is intended for the cooperative of institutions that are regulated and have CDIC protection. No such regulatory oversight existed in the American Synapse example.

Financial Post – cited.

Published Jul 24, 2024  •  Last updated 1 day ago  •  4 minute read

Bank buildings in Toronto's financial district.
Bank buildings in Toronto’s financial district. Photo by Getty Images/iStockphoto

With last week’s rumour about the political demise of Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland proven greatly exaggerated, advocates of open banking in Canada can breathe a sigh of relief that this project won’t be derailed by changes to cabinet.

Recall that Freeland’s April budget announced a legislative framework for introducing open banking this fall, a long-awaited initiative that could eventually change how Canadians bank. Open banking garners broad support in political circles, including Opposition leader Pierre Poilievre, who said it “will give Canadians back control of their banking … and create savings … 365 days of the year.”

For those unfamiliar with open banking, the Finance Department touts it as allowing “consumers and small businesses to securely transfer their financial data through an application interface to approved service providers of their choice.” In short, it offers Canadians and small businesses the right to safely share financial data — typically limited to the internal use of one’s bank — using fintech apps accessible on smartphones and computers.

What will this look like in practice?

With the help of fintech apps, consumers and small businesses can shop around for loans, mortgages, bank accounts and investments. Ultimately, the goal of open banking is to go beyond data sharing to “buying” various financial services and products. We already see this in other G7 jurisdictions such as the United States, where fintech has taken off.

Open banking enthusiasts have lamented the slow pace of change in Canada, yet this offers time to assess the associated risks and how to manage them.

Consider the case of now-bankrupt Synapse Financial Technologies Inc. in the U.S. It pioneered “banking as a service” by managing money mobility, also known as payments. Synapse served as the operational heart of some fintech startups that were leveraging new technology to connect consumers with financial services, such as cheaper loans and high-interest-rate deposits offered by old-school, regulated banks.

The fintech startups do not manage client money — they are essentially brokers. Synapse’s job was to oversee the flow of funds to and from fintech clients and the regulated U.S. banks partnering with the fintechs, some of whom boasted that client deposits were covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., an institution similar to the Canada Deposit Insurance Corp.

This was technically true when the funds reached the regulated bank. But managing those funds in transit was up to Synapse.

Synapse went bust this spring and so the fintech chain it was embedded in broke, exposing the precarious position of impacted fintech clients. Roughly US$300 million in deposits could not be accessed by clients and another US$95 million of customer deposits were missing.

The basics of banking, such as tracking customer monies, fell apart, and nobody is taking responsibility. The founder of one of the impacted startups, Yotta Technology, told the New York Times that “it is not our fault” Synapse and the banks “are unable to account for and reconcile tens of millions of dollars.” As for U.S. banking regulators, they can do little to help. They only become involved after the funds arrive at regulated banks.

The judge overseeing Synapse’s bankruptcy figures that “tens of millions of depositor funds” will never be recovered.

And the Canadian lesson?

Freeland’s open banking framework protects consumers sharing financial information, thereby covering scenarios such as identity theft, and credit card or bank account information breaches. This framework entails a statutory liability, making directors and officers personally liable, that assigns responsibility to the party that permitted the data breach. With potential losses in the millions, good luck collecting from directors and officers at fintech flops such as Synapse.

More critically, what about customer money transferred into fintech companies destined for a Canadian chartered bank or credit union? Canada’s Retail Payment Activities Act (RPAA), overseen by the Bank of Canada, sets out registration requirements and standards, but, as the Canadian Bankers Association noted in December 2023, it “is silent on market conduct.”

In everyday language, who is ensuring fintech payment firms have robust operational infrastructure alongside clear policies and procedures and proactive oversight to ensure compliance?

If that sounds like a bank inspection, it is. That is the level of regulation needed when giving fintech firms responsibility for safeguarding customer money as they pass it through to a government-regulated financial institution with deposit insurance, which is, as noted above, the ultimate open banking objective.

Freeland’s framework assigns oversight to the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. Its vision is to be a “leader and innovator in financial consumer protection.” Fair enough, but as the term itself makes clear, open banking is about banking, and, as the Synapse case reveals, the challenge isn’t only about protecting customer data; it’s about safeguarding people’s savings and the integrity of the financial system.

It is hard to see how Freeland’s framework or the RPAA would prevent a Synapse-like scenario in Canada. This should give her reason for pause.

Canadians long ago deemed it unacceptable to lose their savings when “banking” in Canada. The same will prove true when open banking with fintech apps comes to full fruition.

John Turley-Ewart is a regulatory compliance consultant and Canadian banking historian. Citation follows.

Title:

Gentlemen bankers, politicians and bureaucrats: the history of Canadian Bankers Association, 1891-1924

Author:Turley-Ewart, John Anthony

Keywords:Banks and banking, HistoryBanks and banking, Canada

Issue Date:2000

Abstract (summary):This is a history of the Canadian Bankers Association, a Canadian trade association unlike any other. Its origins are linked to deficiencies in Canada’s Bank Act, 1871 and policies distancing the federal government from demands for assistance from weak banks and their victims—depositors, note holders and investors. Bank failures in the 1870s and 1880s added weight to calls for safer banks and more government regulation, pressure many bankers feared would cause reforms undermining the flexibility the Bank Act allowed them to exercise in their day to day business. A small number of prominent bankers avoided this danger by proposing a fund all banks would to contribute for the protection of note holders. They also suggested a bankers’ association to guard the interests of the fund’s contributors and ultimately the public. When bankers launched their organization, it had specific, yet unwritten, obligations to the federal government. It was supposed to make banking safer and, under pressure from the finance department, limit competition for deposits, a business the government was involved in through its Post Office and Dominion Savings Banks. This thesis will trace the role of the CBA between 1891 and 1924 and show it was anything but a “cozy cartel,” as some scholars have alleged. Competition and rivalry divided Canadian bankers and produced a feckless trade association that could do little to meet calls from governments and those that elected them for safer banks. For Canadian bankers and their association, failure soured relations with politicians and sowed the seeds of public cynicism, leaving a legacy that has shaped the way Canadian governments make bank policy.

Permanent Link:https://hdl.handle.net/1807/122346

ISBN:0612537617
9780612537613

Content Type:Thesis

Bookmark our website and support our journalism: Don’t miss the business news you need to know — add financialpost.com to your bookmarks and sign up for our newsletters here.