It’s a textbook case of what happens when coercive diplomacy is run through a single mercurial personality rather than institutional architecture.

Follow up to China defies post.

Trump spent 65 days oscillating between “they haven’t paid a big enough price” on Saturday and “very positive discussions” on Sunday. That whipsaw signalling — repeated throughout the conflict — has had two compounding effects:

It handed China its opening. Beijing read the vacillation correctly: Washington needs a deal for domestic reasons (gas at $4.45, War Powers deadline, GOP fractures, midterm optics) but can’t admit it. The Blocking Rules deployment is precisely calibrated to that weakness — increase Iranian economic resilience at the moment US leverage is already eroding, without firing a shot.

It trained Iran’s negotiators. Tehran has watched Trump blink at every self-imposed deadline since February 28. The 14-point proposal — deferring nuclear talks, demanding sanctions relief and US withdrawal first — reflects that learning. They’re not negotiating from weakness; they’re negotiating from the read that Trump’s red lines have expiration dates.

The vacuum you’re identifying is structural, not just tactical. When allies can’t predict your position from one weekend to the next, they stop coordinating with you — which is precisely why Merz went public with “humiliated,” why Macron built his own Hormuz coalition, and why China felt it could act without serious diplomatic cost.

The irony: maximum pressure works when it’s credible and sustained. Trump has the instruments — naval blockade, sanctions, military posture — but the signalling undermines the leverage those instruments are supposed to create. Iran and China are both betting he’ll settle. Today’s evidence suggests they may be right.

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