Research Briefing
Published Friday, 24 April, 2026
Describes issues in US-Iran talks in 2026, including the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme and US sanctions.
On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States began a series of strikes against Iran. They said they aimed to induce regime change in the country and target its nuclear and ballistic missile programme. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in the strikes.
Iran has appointed Khamenei’s son as his successor and launched a series of counter-strikes against Israel, US military bases in the region, and military and civilian locations in Arab states. Among Iranian counter actions is closing the Strait of Hormuz, a major global trade route for goods including fuel and gas.
On 6 March, President Trump had said that only Iran’s “unconditional surrender” would be acceptable and said the US would attack Iranian energy infrastructure and bridges if a deal was not reached; he set deadlines of 21 March, then 23 March, then 7 April for a deal. The attacks were subsequently postponed as on 8 April Pakistan arranged a conditional two-week ceasefire (since extended).
Talks between the US and Iran are being mediated by Pakistan, and issues under discussion include freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme, reconstruction and sanctions, and a long-term peace agreement. The talks follow extensive damage to Iran’s military infrastructure and defences as well as to regional energy production.
This page describes negotiations in 2026, the key issues under discussion, and what countries are seeking from the talks. For information on the wider conflict in 2026, see the Library collection page on Iran in 2026.
What talks have been held in 2026?
Two sets of US-Iran talks have been held in 2026, with the first pre-dating the US/Israel-Iran conflict from 28 February.
1) Oman-mediated talks, February 2026
The 2026 conflict followed the failure of indirect talks between the US and Iran. The talks themselves followed the October 2025 triggering of the snapback sanctions against Iran under the 2015 nuclear deal by the UK, Germany and France. The UK Government had backed the February talks, and had called for them to continue.
Like later talks (see below), these talks centred on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme and the timing of any sanctions relief.
Following the end of the February talks, Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, who helped to mediate them, said that he was “confident” that “a peace deal is within our reach” and there had been “substantial” progress. This included that Iran had agreed to “never, ever have a nuclear material that will create a bomb”, which he said was “completely new”.
However, President Trump had said he was “not thrilled” with the talks. The US and Israeli strikes against Iran began the next day.
2) Pakistan-mediated talks, from 8 April 2026
Following nearly six weeks of conflict, on 8 April Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, announced that the US and Iran had agreed a conditional two-week ceasefire, during which talks would held on a lasting agreement.
The US and Iran had exchanged short plans
The US President said that a 10-point plan presented by Iran formed a “workable basis” for talks. The plan referred to by the President has not been released but the BBC has quoted Iranian state media as suggesting one ten-point included Iran’s right to enrich uranium and a commitment to lift all sanctions on Iran (the US has not agreed to either position).
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, also released a statement from the Iranian National Security Council on 8 April, future negotiations would be based on a plan by Iran and a 15-point plan by the US. The US plan has not been published, but the BBC suggests it could include Iran ending all enrichment of nuclear material, limiting its missile production and ending its support for armed groups overseas. In return, the US would support a civilian nuclear programme and lift sanctions against the country.
First talks unsuccessful
On 11 April, talks were held in the Pakistan capital, Islamabad.
Both sides reported progress was made but no agreement was reached. The US President said “most points were agreed to, but the only point that really mattered, nuclear, was not”. He described Iran as “unyielding” on the issue.
Iran’s Foreign Minister said an agreement was “just inches away” but criticised “maximalist demands” from the US negotiators.
No further talks have been confirmed.
Talks were conditional on a ceasefire in Lebanon
Israel and the US said that Pakistan’s agreement did not include Lebanon. The US State Department mediated a separate agreement covering Lebanon, beginning with a ceasefire announced on 16 April; see section 2.2 of the Library briefing, Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Background and UK response.
One of Iran’s negotiators, parliament speaker Mohammed Bager Qalibaf, had said any negotiations with the US would be “unreasonable” if the Israel–Hezbollah conflict were to continue.
President Trump had threatened further military strikes before a ceasefire extension
While diplomatic outreach is continuing, the US is deploying marines and airborne units to the region. The US President has said that the US military will remain in the region until a “real agreement” is complied with, and then “looking forward […] to its next conquest”. On 19 April, President Trump also said that if an agreement was not reached, the US would attack energy and bridges across Iran:
We’re offering a very fair and reasonable deal, and I hope they take it because, if they don’t, the United States is going to knock out every single power plant, and every single bridge, in Iran. No more Mr Nice Guy! They’ll come down fast, they’ll come down easy and, if they don’t take the deal, it will be my honour to do what has to be done, which should have been done to Iran, by other Presidents, for the last 47 years […]
However, on 21 April the US President said that he had agreed to extend the ceasefire until Iran had submitted a proposal for talks. He said the ceasefire extension would remain until discussions are concluded, “one way or another”.
What are the major issues?
There are five major issues being discussed in the talks, many of which echo those in previous rounds of talks (most notably those leading up to the nuclear deal with Iran in 2015). Each is described below.
In the February 2026 talks, divisions between the two sides included the US demand that Iran end all nuclear enrichment activity, the future of its ballistic missile programme, and the timing of sanctions relief.
1) Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme
Core US objectives
Vice President JD Vance says the US’s “core goal” is for Iran to give an:
affirmative commitment that they will not seek a nuclear weapon, and they will not seek the tools that would enable them to quickly achieve a nuclear weapon
In addition to nuclear enrichment, this may also include related missile and weapon technology. The US position in 2025 and 2026 has been that Iran must conduct “zero enrichment”. This was rejected by Iran on earlier occasions.
Since the 8 April announcement of talks, President Trump has said that Iran has agreed to no longer enrich uranium and that the US will recover and remove past nuclear material. However, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization has said Iran will not accept limits on its nuclear enrichment .
Axios news has reported the US may be time-limiting the commitment for Iran to a 20 year period (Iran has countered with five years).
Proposal to send enriched uranium abroad
Negotiations on the nuclear issue have periodically raised proposals for another country, such as Russia, to take Iran’s enriched uranium. However, the Iranian foreign ministry has said that uranium “will under no circumstances be transferred anywhere”.
Level of enrichment is negotiable
While Iran says its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only, it has enriched uranium beyond levels needed for civilian uses. In April, the Iranian Government said it must retain the right to enrich uranium, but the amount and level of enrichment is “negotiable”.
Under the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran had agreed to enrich uranium to a maximum purity of 3.67%, and to cap its stockpile of enriched uranium at 300 kg, down from 10,000 kg, for a 15-year period.
In early June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Associated said it had verified Iran had more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. Sections 2 to 4 of the Library briefing, Israel-Iran 2025: Developments in Iran’s nuclear programme and military action, provides an overview of the programme.
Ballistic missile programme
A further US aim has been to curtail Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which could potentially lead to the development of a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. This was a cited aim of the 2026 attacks and the February 2025 announcement to expand US sanctions against Iran.
In 2025, the Iranian Government had said its missiles were “not up for negotiation”.
2) Iran’s support for armed and terrorist groups
One of President Trump’s aims of expanding sanctions against Iran in 2025 was “neutralis[ing]” “Iran’s terrorist network”. Among the reported elements of the US 15-point plan in March 2026 was Iran ending the use of armed proxies in the Middle East, and stopping its funding and arming of allied terrorist and armed groups across the region. In April, the President said that Iran “must” stop funding Hezbollah in Lebanon, if a deal is to be reached.
Iran has long supported such groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah. But the 2015 nuclear agreement did not restrict Iran’s support for these groups (beyond existing sanctions). This led to criticism from the Arab Gulf states, for whom it was a key demand, as well as the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2020.
However, other negotiations have addressed Iran’s support for armed groups. The October 2025 framework between Israel and Hamas includes that Hamas must disarm, while negotiations in 2026 include the prospect of Hezbollah’s disarmament, which has long been an aim of Israel and the Lebanese armed forces.
To date, both Hamas and Hezbollah have rejected disarmament proposals, citing threats from Israel. See section 4 of the Commons Library briefing Gaza 2026: Board of Peace and National Transitional Committee and Lebanon 2025: Plans to disarm Hezbollah.
3) Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz
Reestablishing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is widely seen as a substantial issue in the April talks.
After the ceasefire announcement, President Trump said that the pause on US strikes was subject to the “complete, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz”, while Iran has described the US counter-blockade (targeting ships seeking to access Iranian ports from 13 April) as a potential “prelude to a violation of the ceasefire”. Neither have removed their blockades.
The US President has also opposed Iranian attempts to charge tolls for vessels to use the strait.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araqchi, has said that “we intend to devise a new arrangement to ensure secure maritime traffic through the waterway” after the conflict (Iranian control was not the case beforehand). This formed part of one version of Iran’s 10-point plan, published by Iran’s Nour News.
The Library briefing on the Strait of Hormuz sets out more on international initiatives to reopen the strait to traffic.
4) Reconstruction and US sanctions
The extent of damage, to both Iran and the region as a whole, is extensive. One Iranian official has suggested there has been US$270 billion in direct and indirect damages within Iranand said that the issue of compensation, including from Gulf states, had been raised with mediators.
The Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has also suggested that the payment of reparations is the “only way” to end the conflict. Iran is also seeking the release of frozen state funds and assets held by the US.
The US has not responded to these suggestions, but President Trump has said that with the conditional ceasefire, “Iran can start the reconstruction process” and “big money will be made”.
Vice President JD Vance has said Iran must “act like a normal country” before the US “treat[s] you economically like a normal country”.
The Iranian economy is heavily sanctioned, particularly by the US, and has experienced high rates of inflation since the US withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed extensive sanctions. A March 2026 report by the UN Development Programme projects that these challenges to Iran’s economy will continue. The closure of Hormuz, through which many Iranian imports and exports flow, will further exacerbate the country’s economic challenges.
Among the substantial costs to the Iranian state budget is military expenditure and its nuclear program.
5) A long-term agreement
Iran has also called for “firm [international] guarantees against future aggression” against Iran.
It has said that it will not accept any further temporary ceasefires.
Iran’s ambassador to China has suggested international guarantees against future conflict could include powers like China, Pakistan, Turkey and Russia.
However, any long-term agreement would likely depend on first resolving other issues, such as Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.
What have others called for?
Israel
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that despite the conditional ceasefire in April, “we still have goals to complete”, and that these would be completed either through diplomacy or by fighting. These include:
- opening the Strait of Hormuz
- securing enriched nuclear material within Iran (described by Israel’s Foreign Minister as a “precondition” to end the conflict)
- “chang[ing] the face of the Middle East in Israel’s favour”.
In his statement announcing the beginning of strikes on 28 February, Prime Minister Netanyahu had also said that Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme must be contained, as well as its support for armed groups (including Hezbollah in Lebanon).
These were also the primary criticisms of Mr Netanyahu against the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which restricted itself to Iran’s nuclear programme.
Arab Gulf states
Iran has attacked all Arab Gulf states with missiles and drones during the conflict as it sought to put economic and political pressure on its neighbours and their security ties with the US. The attacks follow a period of rapprochement in Iran–Gulf state relations, but several have now expelled Iranian diplomats and officials. Bahrain never restored its relations after breaking them off with Iran in 2016.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has experienced the most Iranian attacks, followed by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. There have been relatively fewer attacks on Qatar (though some have caused major damage) and particularly Oman, both of which have historically helped mediate talks between Iran and other states.
All have welcomed the ceasefire agreement. However, it seems unlikely the Gulf states will adopt a united position.
The UAE has been the most publicly critical of Iran, with its ambassador to the US saying that “a simple cease-fire isn’t enough”. The country has called for the “unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz”, for Iran to held liable for reparations and damage, and for a wide agreement that curtails Iran’s support for armed groups in the region and its ballistic and missile programme. It is also reportedly considering whether to freeze Iranian assets. Historically, the UAE has been an important conduit for Iranian trade.
Saudi Arabia has called for the talks to “address all issues” that have contributed to Middle East stability “over the past decades”.
Oman, the only Arab Gulf state to directly criticise the US and Israeli attacks and to welcome the selection of the new Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, will likely seek to maintain a middle road between Iran, the US and the Arab Gulf.
Qatar has noted that “we will be neighbours [with Iran] for the future of humankind”, and co-existence is needed.
The states have also called for the Iraqi Government to better control Iran-backed militias in the country, which also have been conducting attacks in the region.
International Atomic Energy Agency
The agency, which is responsible for monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme, has been unable to resume inspections in the country and so has not been able to verify any damage and extent of Iran’s nuclear programme since the June 2025 Israel/US strikes.
Following the two-week ceasefire announcement, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s head, Rafael Grossi, said that any agreement which does not include provisions for such inspections will be an “illusion of an agreement”.
UK and European states
The UK and European Union have welcomed the ceasefire and called for a long-term agreement. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that UK priorities include reopening the Strait of Hormuzand restoring freedom of navigation. The UK, Germany and France have also called for:
The Iranian regime to end Iran’s nuclear program, curb its ballistic missile program, refrain from its destabilising activity in the region and our homelands, and to cease the appalling violence and repression against its own people.
The EU’s high commissioner for foreign affairs, Kaja Kallas, has said there “must be nuclear experts around the table”, otherwise “we will end up with an agreement that is weaker than the JCPOA [2015 Iran nuclear deal] was”. She also said that, working with regional partners, Iran’s “missile programmes, their support to proxies, also hybrid and cyber activities in Europe” needed to be addressed.
China and Russia
China welcomed the ceasefire announcement and had reportedly been encouraging Iran to seek a pause in the fighting. BBC Monitoring analysis notes that while China has engaged with both Iran and Arab Gulf states during the conflict, the UAE, as its leading trading partner, is the one it has engaged with most and stressed the “strategic significance” of its relations.
Together with Pakistan, on 31 March China had published a five-point plan on the conflict. This included respecting “sovereignty, territorial integrity, national independence and security” of Iran and the Gulf, and “restor[ing] normal passage through the strait as soon as possible”.
As set out in the Library briefing on sanctions applied against Iran under the 2015 nuclear deal, China has opposed the reimposition of sanctions against Iran (as has Russia).
Russia has welcomed the ceasefire agreementand has called for a “comprehensive settlement”. In February, Russia had offered to take Iran’s enriched uranium as part of any political settlement.
Further reading
- Foreign Affairs, How a cease-fire can lead to disaster, 9 April 2026
- Foreign Policy, 5 unanswered questions on the US-Iran cease-fire, 8 April 2026
- Center for International Strategic Studies, The fragile US-Iran ceasefire: Issues to watch, 8 April 2026
- European Council on Foreign Relations, Making peace last: Steps for Europeans to support the Iran-US ceasefire, 8 April 2026
- Chatham House, US–Iran ceasefire: What it means for Trump, Tehran, Israel and US allies, 8 April 2026
- Foreign Policy, Preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb is only getting harder, 7 April 2026
- Javad Zarifin Foreign Affairs, How Iran should end the war, 3 April 2026. He is a former Iranian foreign minister from 2013 to 2021, under which the 2015 nuclear agreement was reached.
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